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This paper examines the organizational tensions arising from mandatory data 
exchange initiatives between private and public organizations. The focus is the UK financial
services sector, which is required to monitor and report on customer identities and 
transactions under the country’s Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Finance 
(AML/CTF) regulations. The transferred data are generated from existing organizational 
activities, systems, processes and working patterns; we examine how government demands 
for such data affect commercial priorities, customer relationships and working patterns in the 
sector. We adopt an exploratory approach to investigate this phenomenon, consisting of 16 
in-depth interviews, analysis of documents and two case studies. Three contributions are
made. First, we use remediation theory to show that existing organizational arrangements are 
reconfigured at multiple analytical levels, creating tensions between the organizations’ 
commercial and compliance roles. Second, we establish the information flow as an 
appropriate unit of analysis in the study of data exchange mechanisms and reveal the flows 
that characterise AML/CTF compliance for financial services organizations. Finally, we 
adopt a ‘set theoretic’ perspective on multi-level organizational research, to argue that the 
multi-level effects of this regulation can be examined in parallel. 
Keywords: Data exchange mechanisms, information flows; financial services; anti-money 
laundering; counter-terrorist finance; remediation; multi-level analysis.
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1.0 Introduction 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the first use of the term ‘War on Terror’1, the 
growing prevalence and intensity of surveillance regimes on civilian populations has been 
under increasing scrutiny. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006 are just two examples of UK legislation that mandates the private sector
to collect and transfer communications, financial, identification and travel data about the 
general population to government. These and other laws place individuals’ data at the heart of 
national security policy. The private sector is thus enlisted in collecting and processing such 
data; constituting what Loader and Walker (2010) identify as a hybrid, networked security 
landscape, within a new political economy of surveillance (Ball and Snider, 2013).
Given the transferred data are generated from existing organizational activities, 
systems, processes and working patterns (Bergström et al., 2011), concerns emerge about 
how these new government demands for customer data align with the activities of private
sector organizations. The limited evidence available (e.g. Dibb et al., 2014) suggests that 
tensions are created because the forced participation of commercial organizations in national 
security programs leads to a dramatic reorganization of work practices. For example, in the 
travel sector, the likely negative consequences of the UK’s e-Borders initiative have led 
travel firms to seek “to return their commercial interests (and those of their customers) to the 
fore, and to restore equilibrium to the disrupted system” (Dibb et al., 2014, p. 58). With 
regard to military and security services, Godfrey et al. (2014, p. 119) argue that “the absence 
of clear and robust forms of accountability, oversight and regulation makes is extremely 
difficult to grasp either the activities or the true scale” of the private security industry. Yet
very little research has addressed how governments’ demands for customer data affect








   
  
  
    
  





    
    
  
 
   
 
    
 
   
  
Crucially, a new discourse is giving “senior management in financial institutions a new 
public responsibility beyond the direct interest of shareholders” (Power, 2013, p. 538).
This paper examines how organizations in the UK financial services sector have 
adapted to the data exchange demands arising from the Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-
Terrorist Finance (AML/CTF) regulations. Three contributions are made. First, drawing on 
remediation theory (Bolter and Grusin, 2000), we show how the capture and transfer of
commercial, transaction data for national security purposes starts to reconfigure the context in 
which that information is collected.  Specifically, we highlight how the AML/CTF data
capture and transfer activities prompt reconfigurations of existing organizational 
arrangements at multiple levels of analysis, creating tensions in terms of the financial 
organizations’ commercial priorities, customer relationships and working patterns. Second, 
we show that such programs rely on the establishment of an information flow between the 
private and public organizations. We argue that the information flow is the appropriate unit of 
analysis for the study of national security programs which, like AML/CTF regimes, are based 
on the analysis of individuals’ behavioral data. Third, drawing on Lacey and Fiss (2009), we 
adopt a ‘set theoretic’ as opposed to a ‘nested’ perspective on multi-level organizational 
research, to argue that the multi-level effects of inter-organizational data exchanges can be 
examined in parallel. This approach allows the application of multiple analytical lenses to the 
problem, enabling the development of a rounded understanding of the impact of large scale 
private-public data transfer programs.
The AML/CTF phenomenon extends beyond the UK to other countries around the 
world (Lepoutre and Oguntoye, 2018; Meifang et al., 2018; Dey et al., 2019). Likewise, large 
scale data transfer programs are not confined to the financial services sector. Rather, they are 
part of the ever-growing expansion of generalised surveillance practices powered by big data, 






   
 
   
    
 
  












   
   






organizations (Zuboff, 2015) and governments alike. For example, the mass surveillance of 
its citizens by the Chinese government has been widely discussed234. Therefore, the
contributions from this paper extend beyond its empirical scope.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set out the conceptual background
of the study, outlining the flows of customer data and information that are part of AML/CTF 
regimes, exploring the information flow as the most appropriate level of analysis and
establishing remediation as a valuable theoretical lens. Section 3 explains our approach to 
data collection and data analysis. Section 4 presents our multi-level findings: at the individual 
and task level; the intra-organizational level; and the organizational and inter-organizational 
level. Section 5 highlights and discusses the study’s main contributions to the understanding 
of the impact of information flows in financial services between private firms and the public 
sectors. In Section 6 the paper concludes with comments concerning a future research 
agenda.
2.0 Conceptual background
2.1. The role of transaction data 
Money laundering “describes the process through which illicit profits are hidden from
authorities, often by using a combination of complex financial transactions and financial
secrecy; and re-introduced into the financial system under the guise of legitimate
transactions” (Sica, 2000: 47). Since most criminal activity is considered to be financially 



















    













forms of crime, from small scale tax evasion to international terrorism, or the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (FAFT, 2019).
Financial transactions leave electronic traces, which can be pursued and connected to 
individuals and their networks (DeGoede, 2012). Thus financial intelligence has become a 
key component of modern national security (DeRosa, 2004), with governments around the
world exploring how they can harness and utilize big data (e.g. Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; 
LaBrie et al., 2018; Jun et al., 2018). In particular, there is growing interest in exploring the 
potential of big data analytics (BDA) and artificial intelligence (AI) in the international fight
against money laundering and terrorism financing (Kaminski & Schonert, 2018). Other
technologies, such as machine learning/artificial intelligence, natural language processing and 
distributed ledger technology are also considered essential to support the processing and 
analysis of ever-growing databases of transaction data (Grint et al., 2017).
2.2. Information flow 
National security programs, such as AML/CTF, are reliant on having access to the 
records of financial transactions carried out by suspect individuals. Financial services
organizations operate as points of entry for cash into the financial system and as major
facilitators of moving money globally. They also have a history of collecting and analyzing 
financial transaction data for commercial purposes, such as customer relationship 
management programs (Canhoto et al., 2017). Customer information is now so central to the 
way financial services organizations operate, that customer data has been described as the 
currency of financial institutions (Kuljis, Macredie and Paul (1998). That is, these private
organizations typically have both the opportunity and the means to collect financial 
transaction data. Governments worldwide have therefore passed legislation ordering financial 













    
 
 
    
   
 
    
 
 
   




                                                            
  
criminal agents, in order to curtail ‘money laundering through the front door’ (Zdanowicz, 
2004).
In the UK, the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) that governs AML/CTF applies to 
banks, building societies, insurance companies and any other organization dealing in 
financial transactions. Professional services firms, such as solicitors and accountants, estate 
agents and dealers in high value goods such as jewellery, boats and luxury cars, are all 
included.
There are two pillars to the AML/CTF regulations (e.g. Ball et al., 2015). First, 
financial services institutions should ‘know your customer’ (KYC). This means that firms are
required to conduct appropriate identity checks when an account is opened. Further, they 
must perform ‘customer due diligence’ (CDD), by monitoring all transactions to identify any 
unusual or suspicious activity based on recognised patterns of behavior (Backhouse et al., 
2005; Ball et al., 2015).
The financial institution is required to report any suspicions to the National Crime 
Agency (NCA), which will investigate and take appropriate action (Backhouse et al., 2005).
Failure to disclose suspicious transactions is a criminal offence (JMLSG, 2006), with 
institutions facing heavy fines and staff risking prosecution if they are seen to fail in their
duty to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. For example, in 2012 HSBC was 
ordered to pay a fine of $1.9bn for failing to report the financial transactions of a Mexican 
drugs baron (Arnold, 2018). The reputational, commercial and legal costs of failing to
comply have resulted in an exponential increase in reporting levels, from 5,000 reports per
year in 1995, to 463,938 in 20185; with most reports being made by the big four UK banks –
National Westminster Bank, Lloyds, Barclays and HSBC.






    
   
  





























organization’s primary role is to pass data concerning suspicious transaction activity of their
customers to the NCA for further investigation. The financial institutions’ organizational 
systems, processes, employees and resources are mobilised to produce a flow of information 
from the customer to the government. In this process, as data are transferred from one agent
to the other, their purpose and nature changes. These changes are illustrated in Table 1 and 
unpacked in the next section.
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Table 1. Information flows in Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorist Finance 
















    





   
 
  
We draw on remediation theory (Bolter and Grusin, 2000), to examine what happens 
in the AML/CTF information flow and the impact it has on the financial services organization 
at the centre of this data collection and transfer exercise. Remediation refers to the 
incorporation of one medium into another. The concept was originally employed to analyze 
the significance of new forms of digital media, such as how changing the format of 
commercially available literature from paper to e-book, impacted on the publishing industry.
Remediation is also at the heart of AML/CTF. Transaction data are not only 
transformed in terms of their format, but also in terms of their meaning, the practices to 
which they are subject and their route through the organization. Remediation theory also 
states that the act of re-mediation refashions the networks of actors, resources and other 
media that produce it (Bowker and Star, 1999). Accordingly, in our examination of 
information flows in AML/CTF, we specifically investigate the networks of actors involved, 
the resources used and the media produced in the process.
In terms of actors, AML/ CTF regulations and guidance have an individuating focus 
on the employee and their morality (Morales et al., 2014). However, organizational elements
such as size, structure and culture can also shape responses to the regulations (Gabbioneta et 
al., 2013). Financial institutions are required to respond to the regulations but each needs to
identify the riskiest products, customers and territories on which to focus their AML 
monitoring efforts. In AML/CTF, the organization and its employees become the means by 
which external criminal and terrorist wrongdoing are detected. As regulatory requirement 
becomes embedded within organizational processes, the ongoing work of various employees 
is re-oriented to balance the reporting and the commercial demands (e.g. Dibb et al., 2014).
In terms of the resources used, AML/CTF has become embedded in the systems and 
practices of UK retail banks. Even though there is scepticism regarding AML’s effectiveness























heavily in customer profiling and transaction monitoring technology to assist in these efforts;
circa £5m a year according to the latest estimates by the regulator (Arnold 2018). A clash of
priorities and transparency problems arises between the commercial processes and national 
security (Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2012; Amicelle, 2011). Balani (2019) notes that 
firms find the training requirements and financial burden of AML/CTF regulations to be high,
while Ryder (2008) suggests that AML/CTF presents organizations with little to gain but 
much to lose.
Regarding new media forms, transaction records that were initially captured as part of 
an ongoing commercial relationship, once analyzed through a compliance lens, re-emerge as 
records of suspicious transactions to be included in suspicious transaction reports. 
Furthermore, once those reports and the associated data records are exchanged with the NCA 
and subject to further analysis, they assume yet a different form; namely records of money 
laundering suspects, to be subjected to criminal investigation. By ensuring that data about 
customers are captured and transferred, the organization remediates the customer, their 
behavior and data about their transactions as the consumer of a financial services product,
into a data-subject with potential to threaten national security. In turn, the banking customer 
relationship is transformed from one of privacy and protection into one which incorporates 
suspicion and surveillance (Backhouse et al, 2005). Reporting customers runs against the 
traditional strategic objectives of banks, the culture of privacy (Donaghy, 2002) between a 
bank and its customer, and how performance is assessed and rewarded (Canhoto, 2008).
Criminal activities involving data are also highly varied and can sometimes be difficult to 
distinguish from legitimate activities (e.g. FATF 2018). The technical limitations arising from
the lack of reliable profiles mean that financial intelligence is a ‘speculative endeavour’ (de 
Goede, 2012, p. 58); especially because money laundering evolves as criminals attempt to 
























(Whisker & Lokanan, 2019) or virtual currencies (Vandezande, 2017). Concerns are raised 
regarding how financial services organizations adapt to this intermediary role and how this
phenomenon might be studied.
The remediation of customer data into suspicious money laundering activity has the 
potential to reconfigure local social, political and material orders within the organization, 
which we investigate empirically, as detailed in the next section.
Empirically exploring the AML/CTF regime involves examining how this remediated 
information flow comes into contact with different organizational elements. The selection of
remediated information flow as a unit of analysis is a deliberate theoretical move which 
highlights these multi-level effects (Chen, Mathieu, and Bliese, 2004; Mathieu and Chen, 
2011). There are, however, some conceptual issues with the parallel treatment of different
levels of analysis within one analysis. A common conceptual approach to an organization’s 
hierarchical and analytical levels is to think of them as nested within each other. This 
approach has been adopted in the study of organizational fraud regulation (Shadnam and 
Lawrence, 2011) but is identified elsewhere as inhibiting multi-level analyses (Lopes Costa, 
2013). 
Reflecting these concerns, we adopt a networked-style ‘set logic’ to identify 
connections in our dataset (Lacey and Fiss, 2009). Our approach is illustrated in Figure 1, 
where we highlight the multiple and overlapping ‘sets’ in our analysis: we explore 
remediation points at the individual and task level; at the intra-organizational level; and at the 
organizational and inter-organizational level. Set logic moves away from the use of analytical 
levels as de facto groupings of data in a research problem-space. Instead, it views 
organizational problem spaces as overlapping multidimensional groupings of phenomena 
occurring at different analytical levels. This approach does not structure the problem space a 

















   
 
AML/CTF ‘set’ of phenomena features organizational elements, which might be different in 
analytical level, but similar in that they are reconfigured and drawn together by the thread of 
information flow. A nested approach is also not appropriate because AML/CTF, as a set of 
external regulations, is not necessarily aligned with an organization’s core commercial
activities and interests. It only directly affects the parts of the organization which come into 
contact with the customer and take part in risk assessing their behavior, identity and 
transaction patterns. The entire organization is not nested within the remit of these 
regulations, only parts of it interact, adapt and change as a result. For example, certain 
departments of the financial services organization will interact with law enforcement 
agencies to assist in cases not related to AML/CTF, such as helping to trace the last 
movements of a missing person. Furthermore, as those in charge of AML/CTF within the 
organization are not in a hierarchical management relationship with the front line workers
and managers who are looking for suspicious activity, hierarchical nesting is not present 
either. Hence, we view the boundaries between regulatory activity and customer focused 
activity as permeable, not necessarily hierarchical and as connected by information flow, 
forming the AML/CTF ‘set’.  





























• External stakeholders, 
e.g. NCA, FCA
• Firm (bank, building 
society, etc.)




This paper pursues a fine-grained thematic analysis of interview data to explore the 
remediation processes and information flows which constitute AML/CTF compliance data
exchange schemes. The study is distinctive in its use of primary qualitative data. Most 
AML/CTF research tends to rely on post hoc analysis of secondary sources such as court
reports, official enquiry reports and historical documents (e.g., Compin, 2008; Mitchell et al., 
1998; Sathye and Islam, 2011).  Where contemporary primary empirical data are used, the 
emphasis is usually on survey-based methodologies (e.g., Pok, Omar and Sathye, 2014).  
Only a few studies draw on interview-based accounts (e.g., Canhoto, 2008). 
An exploratory research method was followed, with data collection unfolding in two 
phases. During the first phase, detailed insights were gathered into the research context 








    
 





   




   
 
  
                                                            
    
service industry events devoted to crime detection6, and key informant interviews.
Specifically, 16 interviews were conducted with senior staff from regulatory bodies and 
industry associations, as well as senior executives and MLROs from investment banks, retail 
banks, insurance companies and building societies. Analysis of these interviews, together
with notes taken at several industry events, generated vital information about the institutional 
and regulatory context of AML/CTF, as well as the strategic and operational issues facing 
financial services institutions responding to the regulations. The insights gained from this
phase also helped the researchers to decide which specific organizational (inter as well as 
intra), individual and task elements to focus on in the second phase of data collection (in 
accordance with the set-theory perspective), to refine the terminology to be used in that 
phase, and to interpret the case study data gathered.
The second data collection phase explored the operational impacts of the regulations 
in two case organizations: a bank (Company A) and a building society (Company B) which 
had recently merged, generating a further ten interviews from which the data within this 
paper are drawn. Due to the sensitive nature of AML/CTF operations, it was extremely 
difficult to secure access: many avenues were tried with many different organizations until a 
personal recommendation secured access to the case organizations. The recent merger placed 
Company A in control of the AML/CTF operation with Company B reporting to Company A. 
One MLRO covered both companies. In each company, financial crime managers and staff
were interviewed (two from Companies A and B respectively) and customer facing staff in 
high street branches or call centres (four from Company A and two from Company B). 
The interview guide for the case study interviews reflected the three levels of remediation 
described in section 2.3: the actors involved, specifically the individuals and organizational 























units; the resources implicated, to examine the impact of the regime on the organization; and 
the media, to capture the operational adaptations made as a result of the regulations.
Where permission was granted, interviews were recorded, otherwise
contemporaneous notes were taken. The majority of interviews were undertaken by at least 
two researchers, allowing comparison of notes to ensure understanding and completeness. 
3.2 Data Analysis
This paper explores the multi-level adaptations which take place in financial services 
organizations’ actors, resources and media, as they comply with AML/CTF. The analytical 
approach follows Neu et al.’s (2013: 510) study of accounting and networks of corruption in 
which they describe “follow[ing] the flow of money through a complex web of financial 
transactions”. In this study, rather than focusing on flows of money, we focus on the flows of 
data and information between private and public organizations. The following aspects were
considered: (i) the impact of the regime on financial services institutions; (ii) the flow of data
and information about suspicious customers and transactions through and beyond each of the 
organizational elements of the AML/CTF set identified in Figure 1; and (iii) how information 
is remediated as it moves across the AML/CTF set (Bolter and Grusin, 2000; Lee, 2012). 
Data were ordered using a fine grained and iterative thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 
1998). Patterns in explanation and reasoning were inductively explored by cross-referencing 
verbatim coded extracts of interviewee data to construct the AML/CTF compliance process. 
By progressively refocusing the thematic analysis, more detailed codes were produced. The 
resultant record linked the situated fieldwork, the texts which represented it and the ideas 
which underpinned interviewees’ accounts. Data were coded in N-Vivo; with 189 coded 
extracts of interview data identified which featured information flow as a theme. These 189 



















    
    
   
  
   
 
   
reading of the codes emerged in a coding workshop in which the researchers worked together
to identify the information flows and remediation processes in each extract. Inter-coder 
reliability was high, but where differences occurred these could be resolved by looking at the 
text in its fuller context (Miles and Huberman, 1994). By combining data from multiple 
interviewees with differing roles in the process, and augmenting with the additional data
sources from phase 1 of the data collection, a detailed picture of the AML/CTF compliance 
process across the different organizational elements and at the different levels of analysis of 
the AML/CTF set, began to emerge. 
Insight and opportunities for reflection during the data analysis were provided by 
referring to information gathered from the key informant interviews, corporate and media
documents, and the industry events. Guidance on AML/CTF practice provided by the Basel
Committee, the UK National Crime Agency and the Financial Conduct Authority was also 
consulted, while a workshop for research participants at the conclusion of the project 
provided a further opportunity to reflect on the findings.  
4.0 Findings
The findings are organized into four parts. We begin with an overview of the organizational 
elements that enable the data exchange, in order to provide the context in which the
information flows take place, and to explain how the financial crime department is positioned 
as the hub of the AML/CTF operation. We then present the findings regarding the three types 
of remediation (namely actors, resources and media) occurring in each of the three levels of 
analysis of the AML/CTF ‘set’. The individual and task level focuses on front line staff. The 
intra-organizational level reveals how the financial crime departments bring together different
information sources to be remediated into evidence for suspicious activity reports. The 






    
  























and corporate reputation in relation to external stakeholders like government and industry 
associations. Table 2 summarises the findings. The quotes presented in the section are
representative, chosen collectively by the researchers.
Actors Resources Media
Individual and New roles (e.g., New skill sets (e.g., Customer (e.g., 





keeping one eye on 
service and another 





score, age) and 

















analysts, and the 


















Decision to close 
accounts; profit vs. 
dirty money








   




   











The organizational arrangements for managing data flow in the banks reflected those 
described in the literature, as captured in Table 1. Employees, customers, financial crime 
departments and strategic organizational actors were enrolled into producing the information 
flow. Front line customer facing staff, financial crime departments and the companies’
MLRO – a strategic level role – each remediated information about suspicious transactions 
towards the NCA. Front line customer facing staff, in branches and call centres, initiated
information flows by implementing ‘Know Your Customer’, gathering and validating 
information from identity documents when a customer opens an account, and ‘Customer Due 
Diligence’ by monitoring customer behavior during transactions and reporting anything 
unusual to the financial crime department.
The organization’s financial crime department was the hub of AML/CTF, receiving 
information about AML/CTF from all directions. It received reports from staff via the money 
laundering detection system, which were investigated using in-house investigators and 
outsourced service providers, if appropriate. A decision was then taken on whether to act
upon these suspicions and submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the National Crime 
Agency (NCA). The NCA was the ultimate recipient of the SAR. Upon investigation, the 
NCA decided if and how to pursue customers directly, finishing the information flow
between customers, financial services organizations and government. The next section 
examines these remediation points in more detail. In each case, the data remediated and the
organizational elements which were reconfigured as a consequence, are explored.
4.2. Individual and task level: Customer facing front line
The first set of remediations occurred at the customer facing front line. Front line staff
were responsible for identifying suspicious behavior in customers and reporting it to the 







   
  
 
   
 
     
 
    
 
   
  
    
   
 
 




as opening accounts, accepting deposits or providing financial advice. According to one 
financial crime manager, front line staff bore the burden of the vigilance required to initiate 
information flows about customers: 
Anti-money laundering, partly because of our size and partly because of the nature of 
our business, it’s not an easy thing to fully automate …. and so we have a mixture of 
system support, which probably only forms 30% or 40% of our controls, and the rest 
of it is due diligence by the staff. (Financial Crime Manager, Company A)
Various pieces of information became remediated into the front line employees’ decision 
about whether to report an incident using the company’s Money Laundering Detection 
System. First, staff used information from existing information systems they were able to
access. For instance, credit scoring systems enabled the employee to evaluate a customer’s 
identity and creditworthiness. Judgements were also partly informed by the customer 
management system, which displayed all account transactions and other customer details 
during the customer interaction. Using this system, staff in both companies were able to 
decide whether customer behavior was ‘unusual’ compared to their previous account usage.
Employees also used their knowledge of the AML/CTF regulations, which warned about very 
young or very old customers. These customers’ lack of financial independence afforded them
greater scrutiny in case they were being manipulated by another party (JMLSG, 2006).
Information gleaned from employees’ previous experience also sensitised them to 
nationality7. For example, a customer from a country associated with organized crime or
terrorism, and/or presenting with very poor language skills, might be sources of suspicion. 
This branch manager described a situation where a newly arrived immigrant who could not 
speak English was trying to open an account. Eventually the obvious language barriers 
7In early 2014 BBC Radio 4’s ‘Money Box’ detailed a court case brought by nine innocent Iranian citizens 


















   
 
   
caused the manager to become suspicious:
…he can’t speak English so how can I physically open …him an account? That’s 
difficult because you might have his brother sat next to him who has brought in four 
people in one week – this has happened before – and he’s trying to open an account for 
these people because he is doing the translation for his family. How do you know that
he’s telling that person what you’re telling him? (Senior Branch Advisor, Company A)
Contextual factors in the branch and customer appearance also informed their judgement:
…the customer has come in, he’s drawn £4,000 and what he’s said it’s for is a new car. 
However, outside … he went back outside and got in a Mercedes that was 2011, brand 
new, it was like this was the registration plate, the customer had a tattoo on his left 
arm… (Senior Branch Advisor, Company A)
With multiple information sources remediated into their decision, front line staff 
described three ways in which the nature of their work had changed because of AML/CTF. 
First, at the individual level of analysis, staff skillsets had been reconfigured. Staff described 
how the tacit AML/CTF knowledge they had developed caused them to approach the 
customer interaction with one eye on service and another on suspicion. Such tacit knowledge 
enabled staff to distinguish between suspicious behavior or otherwise. Front line staff made 
judgements about the customer’s demeanour, their comportment and attire, the circumstances 
of their arrival and departure from a branch, or whether ‘things added up’ about them or not, 
based on their tacit knowledge and experience of working in a customer-facing role, while 
possibly also drawing on their ‘instincts’ or ‘stereotypes’ of what might constitute suspicious 
activity.
Second, customer handling skills became reconfigured. Sales-like performativities
were mobilised around security to ensure remediation occurred: putting the customers off, 






















                                                            
   
featured (see also Ericson and Doyle, 2004). A bank call centre employee described the 
process of keeping the customer comfortably in suspense:
You don’t let on in any way that you’re suspicious. You just process as normal. Say, 
okay, that’s fine, here’s your application number. One of three things, it’ll either 
decline, it will either go through accepted, which means it’s agreed, so just around 
formalities, or it will refer, needing the further information … Let’s say they come back 
in a couple of days to get a decision, it could be that there are notes from fraud on 
there, from AML, because they’re checking things. And we’ll say, you just have to wait 
a couple of days, it’s still coming through, we’re still waiting for the result from the 
team. Not letting on in any way that we’re checking into them, basically. (Call Centre 
Employee, Company B)
A bank branch employee noted that ‘dealing with people 24/7 means actually you’re 
quite good and quite adept at having those kinds of conversations’ (Senior Branch Advisor, 
Company A). The regulations were an added motivator. As a result of having to report any 
suspicions they had about the customer without ‘tipping them off’8, front line retail finance 
employees were required by law to maintain a veneer of service in the face of suspicion. 
‘Tipping off’ involves letting a potential suspect know they are under suspicion, which would 
compromise any future criminal investigation. Staff could receive at best a fine, or at worst, a 
five year prison sentence if found guilty of such offences. 
Finally, at the task level of analysis, sales work and its performance management had 
been reconfigured to incorporate notions of AML/CTF compliance. The ‘compliant sale’
emerged as a performance ideal: one which incorporates both commercial and regulatory 
priorities; and against which employees were performance managed. This branch manager
succinctly explains how the performance rating system picks up compliance problems in 
























   
sales transactions, reflecting how performance management processes have institutionalised 
compliance alongside sales:
…we are salespeople … however it doesn’t matter how good your sales are, your sales 
could be 200%, if you’re not managing your compliance … again you would not get 
‘achieving’ [reference to internal performance rating system], because you’re not 
doing your job, regardless as to how good the sales are. (Branch Manager, Company 
B)
In summary, at the front line remediation point, different forms of information were 
used by the employee to judge whether customer behavior was suspicious or not. If so, it was 
remediated into a report to the financial crime department. Information from existing 
systems, the customer’s characteristics and observed behavior as well as their knowledge of 
normal behavior on different accounts, were remediated. Reconfigurations also occurred in 
terms of the employees’ tacit knowledge and skills, as well as in terms of the nature of their 
task and its performance management.
4.3 Intra-organizational level: Financial crime department 
The second remediation point occurred in the financial crime departments of the case 
organizations. The work of the financial crime departments primarily involved the 
remediation of new information into evidence files on potential wrongdoers. This information 
came from different sources. Information received from the front line was investigated and 
remediated to produce new insight and intelligence about the crime and risk-based aspects of 
the organization’s operations. In addition, the department monitored all transactions in real 
time and screened them on a daily basis using a Transaction Monitoring System (TMS). 
Outputs from the TMS were investigated and added to files if they indicated suspicious 

























services product provided by the bank. To assist in setting their search parameters, the 
departments remediated information from organizational Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) software relating to consumer profiles. The profiles indicated an 
acceptable range of product use, beyond which customer activity would be deemed unusual
or suspicious. Financial crime department employees highlighted how different types of 
account attract different rules:
I think we’ve got about nine rules with regard to the savings accounts and five on 
mortgage accounts, and we’ll go and look … For example, one of the rules could be a 
large cash deposit or large cash withdrawal. If it happens on a customer’s account, we 
would get an alert. That comes in every morning. (Financial Crime Employee, 
Company B)
Finally, as with front line staff, financial crime staff also had tacit knowledge as to 
what a particular kind of consumer using a particular product would ‘normally’ do with it. 
Whether a customer appeared to be conforming to that lifestyle and the range of financial
transactions that accompanies it was enough to raise questions:
…it’s all about lifestyles, and obviously different accounts are for different lifestyles. 
Because obviously a very basic account would be for someone who may not be earning 
that much, hasn’t got enough of a credit report to get a higher level account. So really, 
although you can’t use it as law, really, though, looking at one account can let us know 
or give us an idea of what we shall be seeing going through that account, as compared 
to someone else. (Financial Crime Employee, Company A)
Tacit knowledge also influenced the sensitivity of the search parameters used, so that 
a manageable amount of positive identifications resulted, as this MLRO explains:
…the trick is making sure you don’t produce so many false positives that you’re just 













   













thousands of payments … you’re going to miss something because you’re going to be 
blinded by the one that is a match. (MLRO, Company A)
As well as monitoring the transactions of their customers, they were required to run 
TMS searches in response to new watch lists released from NCA, HM Treasury, Department 
of Work and Pensions, local authorities or the police. Such requests would concern finding 
evidence of persons suspected of being involved in organized crime or terror, or who were
politically exposed. Once enough evidence had been amassed, the department would make a 
recommendation to the MLRO that a SAR should be submitted. 
The activities of the financial crime departments studied reconfigured elements at the 
intra-organizational level of analysis: organizational communication patterns and internal 
boundaries. First, interesting communication patterns emerged from the vast upward flow of
information to financial crime. The financial crime departments did not feed back to front line 
staff on their reports, to avoid influencing how they then dealt with the customer. Chains of 
secrecy, based on the AML/CTF regulations concerning tipping off, began to characterize 
interactions between financial crime departments and the rest of the organization, as this 
branch manager explains:
…they said you won’t get feedback; there’s two reasons you won’t get feedback. One, 
because if you do get feedback you might treat that customer differently, and that’s
classed as tipping off, and if the customer gets in tune with that obviously then you’re 
again tipping him off when you might have not meant to. (Senior Branch Advisor, 
Company A)
The amassing of evidence was also important in financial crime employees’
descriptions of their expertise. This had the effect of legitimating new internal boundaries
based on this expertise and with whom they shared information. This financial crime 













   
  
 




   
  
 
…we understand a lot more than the front line people will, we still have to make our 
own decision as to whether it is suspicious; whether we feel that that could do with 
looking at in a bit more detail in a couple of months’ time after we’ve got a bit more of 
an idea, their account use, or it’s just not suspicious and we can close it off and just 
wait. It might crop up again, and then we can take the bigger picture. (Financial Crime 
Employee, Company A)
The insight gained by AML/CTF processes was only rarely shared with other 
departments or functions because of customer privacy and internal fraud concerns. Where
any sharing of information took place, it was done on a ‘need to know’ basis, as illustrated by 
this member of the financial crime team:
The only team that our work sometimes feeds into is we have obviously our internal 
security and risk management teams. Now they deal with, sometimes it could be 
internal matters, or it could be external matters where maybe we feel a customer is 
being scammed, so we can then feed that information on to them and say what we think: 
you need to look at this. But as regards any other department, we don’t feed it to 
anyone. (Financial Crime Employee, Company A)
In summary, at the financial crime department remediation point, different types and 
sources of information were brought together to be remediated into evidence upon which a 
legitimate suspicious activity report could be based. Reports from the wider organization, 
evidence generated by transaction monitoring and the screening of watch lists, were 
investigated as appropriate. Tacit knowledge developed from CRM systems guided employee 
judgement and helped to set search parameters. As a result, financial crime evidence and 
expertise were built to legitimate the work of the department and to influence communication 
patterns. Information was shared on a highly selective basis but not with the wider










   
   
  
  




   
 
4.4 Organizational and inter-organizational level: Strategic issues
With many different organizational resources being mobilised to meet the AML/CTF
regulatory requirements, and with the MLROs occupying a strategic role which covered both 
case organizations, strategic organizational elements began to reconfigure. In this section, we 
draw upon insights from key informants working at strategic levels, from industry 
associations and from government, to focus on perceptions of how AML/CTF changes a 
firm’s ability to compete and its corporate reputation. 
In relation to competition, AML/CTF exerted pressure on organizational resources 
and priorities. One interviewee claimed “Ultimately banks are not interested in the good 
citizen role. There are no obvious benefits to the organization of applying AML measures”
(Senior Executive, Retail Bank) and another: “There is more time and money being spent on 
overheads, such as regulation and AML, than on sales” (MLRO, Investment Bank). An 
additional aggravating factor was the global financial crisis which had put the financial
institutions under even greater scrutiny. Each described how AML/CTF issues were given 
even higher priority than before the crisis, since they did not want to be seen to make further
mistakes. As such there was some recognition, as one interviewee suggested, of “turning a 
negative into a positive” and exploring the commercial benefits offered by AML/CTF. This
MLRO outlined how pragmatism was necessary:
It’s just, there’s no point in fighting it because it’s not … we internally cannot 
influence the law in the short-term and in the current climate we’re just lucky to be 
able to keep going, sort of thing, so you just make do. And the more time you waste on 
questioning and all, then the less time you have to actually address the clients’ needs I 














    
 
 









This pragmatism was underpinned by deep tensions between commercial and 
regulatory priorities, which also surfaced in relation to AML/CTF and corporate reputation. 
There are strong financial reasons for banks to ignore their obligations under AML/CTF: 
…if an account is laundering ill-gotten gains, the likelihood is it’s going to be quite a 
good income earner for the bank – that’s the reality of it… and this goes right up to 
senior management… but if we say we’ve got concerns about this customer and these 
customers are x y and z, we’ll get it closed down. (Financial Crime Manager, 
Company A)
It was acknowledged, however, that AML/CTF compliance can make or destroy a
bank’s reputation:
A bank in the US was brought down because of their lax in AML controls – it literally
brought them down … the bank doesn’t want to be, well, we want to do business, want 
to make money…but we don’t want to make; we don’t want to be making the money 
from dirty money.  Or even have that perception that we’re doing that.  (Financial 
Crime Manager, Company A)
In summary, at the point where remediated AML/CTF information flowed out of the 
organization and was visible at a strategic level, effects at both organizational and inter-
organizational levels were observed. Strategic actors identified the ways in which reporting 
potentially reconfigured both tangible and intangible corporate assets. Resources and 
reputation were mobilised into compliance rationales, which highlighted that while these 
regulations intersected transversally with commercial priorities, they nevertheless had the 











   

















This paper considers how government demands for customer data under the 
AML/CTF regulations intertwine with the organizational processes and priorities of the 
financial services organizations in charge of collecting and transferring such data. In this 
section, we summarise the tensions arising at the three analytical levels and draw out the 
main contributions of the study. The AML/CTF regulations’ requirements position financial 
services organizations as intermediaries with systems that both enable the transfer of funds
and are used to compile and transmit data that evidences wrongdoing (Canhoto et al., 2017). 
This dual role created tensions between the activities required for the delivery of the original 
(commercial) service to its customers on the one hand, and those required for the 
performance of the new (AML/CTF) service to law enforcement on the other. Consistent with 
previous AML/CTF research (e.g., Amicelle and Favarel-Garrigues, 2012; Ryder 2008), we 
detected across all levels of analysis a clash between commercial priorities and practices and 
this security imperative.
5.1 Tensions at multiple analytical levels 
At the individual level, this tension was manifested in the way individuals balanced
conflicting demands, such as serving versus reporting on the customer; and selling products
versus protecting the organization from being involved in AML/CTF. We witnessed attempts 
to start addressing these tensions and to find common ground between the two conflicting 
goals, as in the case of the compliant sale. Ball et al (2013) report a similar phenomenon in 
their study of front line employees in the airline industry, in which they describe attempts to 
bridge infrastructural gaps, as a coping mechanism in the face of changing workloads and 
shifting professional identities.
At the intra-organizational level, this tension manifested itself in the creation within 





    
 









    
 





   
 
surveillance obligations imposed by AML/CTF regulations. This unit used financial and 
technical resources that might otherwise have been directed to achieve commercial goals, and 
used communication in an asymmetrical way to give primacy to the AML/CTF role over the 
commercial one. Our observations echo Zuboff’s (2015) analysis of the phenomenon of 
surveillance capitalism, where the accumulation of data results in the creation of asymmetries
in terms of knowledge and power. Zuboff (2015) suggests this asymmetry is manifested 
between the owners of a data driven service (e.g., Google) and the service users. In our 
analysis, such asymmetry is also manifested between different parts of the same organization.
At the inter-organizational level, the tension was felt in the competing demands on 
time and other resources resulting from the power struggle between institutionalised 
corporate and state interests. The AML/CTF information flows placed these firms in double 
jeopardy. On the one hand, meeting the AML/CTF requirements goes against the fiduciary 
duty of financial services organizations towards their customers (Canhoto, 2008), and could 
limit their ability to meet day-to-day business goals. On the other, a failure to meet
AML/CTF compliance requirements could potentially damage the commercial survival of the 
firms, as well as national security interests (Huysmans, 2014).
5.2 Key contributions of the study
Several theoretical and practical contributions emerge from the findings. Our first 
contribution is largely theoretical and concerns the utility of remediation theory as an 
analytical lens to provide deeper evidence about how AML/CTF reconfigures the different 
elements within the organization. Remediation theory (Bolter and Grusin, 2000) highlights 
that social, political and material reconfigurations occur when information is gathered and 
transformed into new digitally mobile forms. Our findings also show that the AML/CTF 









   
 
   
  
 








   
  
   
 
required new investment, and instilled new ways of viewing the financial organization’s role
and profit in society. Remediation is at the heart of AML/CTF because of its imperative to 
gather and electronically transfer evidence of wrongdoing among customers’ transaction 
records. By analytically identifying three different remediation points – at the front line, in 
the interactions with the financial crime department and through the relationship with
external shareholders and entities – the findings reveal how organizational elements were 
reconfigured to accommodate AML/CTF requirements. 
We demonstrate how multiple data points were combined to produce evidence of 
suspicious activity. Front line staff used information from credit scoring information systems, 
customer management systems, their knowledge of the regulations and their instincts about 
customer behavior, to inform their assessments. This process began reconfiguring staff’s tacit 
knowledge, customer handling skills, the task and its performance management. The financial 
crime department used reports from the front line but also generated insight using TMS 
searches, the CRM system and tacit knowledge about customer lifestyles and normal account
use. Organizational communication patterns unique to AML/CTF processes emerged, with
new organizational boundaries based on the specialist expertise and interests of the financial
crime department. As the organization’s MLROs submitted SARs to the NCA, strategic level 
actors questioned the regulation’s effect on tangible and intangible assets. Space limitations 
prevented an in-depth analysis of the organizational meaning systems surrounding these 
activities. However, the data identified struggles for organizational legitimacy by the
financial crime departments and front line staff being made responsible for crime prevention. 
Employees worked hard to formulate their reasoning for suspicion to render it ‘reportable’ in 
AML/CTF systems, using available data and their customer experience to tease that out. 
The paper’s second contribution concerns the use of information flow as a unit of 






    
  









   
    




    
 
 
research was conducted, which resulted in a range of practical insights being generated. In 
order to understand how an organization can act as an intermediary in a national security 
regime, we adopted Neu et al.’s 2013 approach, and focused on what and how information 
was exchanged between the various parties. Information about suspicious activities connected 
the banks and the NCA, as the data flowed from the customer to the government via the 
financial organization. However, tracing this passage through the organization demonstrates
that information has different viscosities, so that it does not flow automatically and freely. 
The extent to which information about suspicious activities flowed depended on factors that 
included the vigilance and decisions of human beings, available resources, the weight of 
existing evidence about a particular case, information to hand, tacit knowledge, system search 
parameters, labor, time and expediency. At times, these factors were in conflict with each 
other. The findings further show that information did not flow both up and down the 
organization. Front line staff identified an almost Kafkaesque upward information flow
created by the law of ‘tipping off’. Although these staff perceived that they needed feedback 
on the quality of their reporting, none was forthcoming. We believe this unit of analysis is 
useful for understanding how staff manage the multiple requirements on their labor and 
expertise, given such limited feedback. A similar approach could be useful for future studies 
of private sector involvement in national data exchange programs where organizations are 
intermediaries between the general public and the government.
Our final contribution, which concerns the multi-level nature of the study, is both 
conceptual and methodological. By examining three remediation points, a reconfiguration of 
organizational elements at three different analytical levels was revealed (see Table 3 below), 
resulting in some rich practical insights. In organization theory terms, multi-level effects were 
observed. For the organization theorist, there are conceptual issues with the parallel treatment 

























requires consideration as a whole problem space, as well as a set of interlinked parts, may 
help explain why organization theorists have been silent on the use of the private sector in 
national security arrangements: As Lopes Costa (2009, p. 4) comments, due to diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds “organizational researchers are likely to highlight either a micro- or 
a macro- perspective. What is, perhaps, lacking is the operationalization of that multilevel
thinking in more research that actually converts an encompassing vision of organizations in 
empirical studies”.
One of the ideas we drew upon was a ‘set logic’ to define the relationship between 
different organizational levels of analysis that occurred simultaneously in one study (Lacey 
and Fiss, 2009). This approach is in different to a ‘nested’ logic, in which each level would be 
embedded within the other, making a complete picture difficult to describe. Table 3 shows 
the multi-level effects which result from information flow as part of the AML/CTF ‘set’ of 
phenomena. 
Level Organizational element reconfigured
Individual and Task: Changes in tacit knowledge of front line employees about
suspicious behavior.
Changes in customer handling skills of front line employees.
Changes in the content of sales work to include compliance.
Changes in the performance management of sales work.
Intra organizational: Emergence of chains of secrecy in organizational communication 
patterns.











   
 
  
    









   
  
  
departments reinforce their expertise.
Organizational and 
Inter-organizational:
Recognised pressure on organizational resource distribution 
towards regulatory compliance.
Changes to ability of organizations to compete on a level playing 
field because of investments required in AML/CTF.
Perceived centrality of AML/CTF to corporate reputation.
Table 3: Multi-level effects of the AML/CTF data exchange program
5.3 Reshaping organizational elements at multiple levels by new information flows
Within each level of analysis, one or more organizational elements is transformed by 
AML/CTF information flows. Some of these elements inter-relate and influence one another.
For instance, the (KYC) requirements led to changes in the customer data routinely captured 
when opening an account, and instigated a heightened contextual awareness among staff, as 
highlighted in our findings and summarised in Table 2. This observation echoes the findings 
from research examining the impact of e-Borders regulation on the travel sector, where the 
need to monitor travellers shaped how customers were dealt with, marketing related activities 
or even the user interface of booking systems (Dibb et al., 2014).
Changes in knowledge and skillsets necessarily altered the shape and nature of tasks, 
which needed in turn, to be performance managed. The establishment of a dedicated financial 
crime department redrew internal boundaries and communication patterns. Patterns of 
reporting SARs to the NCA caused senior managers to reflect on how resources were 
distributed, the competitive playing field and corporate reputation.
Poor performance in AML/CTF potentially undermined corporate reputation, which
affected the firm’s ability to compete in the marketplace. Similarly, optimum resource 
























   
   
 
   
information regarding suspicious transactions was generated for every transaction and 
sometimes acted upon, these processes were in a constant state of flux. Simultaneously, skills 
and knowledge became honed, roles became shaped, internal boundaries became redrawn, 
resources were distributed in new ways and reputations were made or destroyed by virtue of 
AML/CTF. In the next section, we identify some of the opportunities for future research to 
extend such insights.
6.0 Conclusion
A panoply of newly enacted laws in the UK and worldwide positions the private 
sector as a data source for national security, imbuing these organizations with the surveillance 
powers of the sovereign state. This activity reflects governments’ attempts to tap into the big 
data capabilities of corporations (e.g. Amankwah-Amoah, 2016; LaBrie et al., 2018; Jun et 
al., 2018) and is part of the ever-growing surveillance economy (Zuboff, 2015). An 
organizational treatment of the phenomenon of mandatory data exchanges between private
and public organizations has been long overdue. Business disciplines have strong 
contributions to make to debates about the operationalisation of national security.
Our study has highlighted how strategy, systems, the customer relationship and 
employees are impacted. Many of the observed phenomena occurred because they are 
mandated by this regulation. Reporting suspicions, not tipping off, investigating unusual 
transactions, responding to watch lists and submitting SARS, are all examples of regulatory 
compliance in action. However, our data show that skill, effort, resources and intangible 
assets are deployed; and organizational processes are reshaped to create and maintain an
information flow to government. This is the political economy of involving the private sector 
in actioning public programs, with destabilisation and change from dealing with mandatory 











   
 








reveal the potential for different business disciplines to study these areas in more detail. 
Critical accounting, marketing, strategy, policy studies academics, consumer behavior
experts, employee relations academics and organization theorists could each use this analysis 
to develop a research agenda based on their own unique perspectives. 
Our first contribution concerns the utility of remediation theory in exploring the 
information flows in the financial services sector. We show that the mandatory data capture 
and exchange activities reconfigure existing organizational arrangements at multiple 
analytical levels, creating tensions between the commercial and compliance roles of financial 
services firms. Specifically, we find tensions in terms of commercial priorities, customer 
relationships and working patterns. Future research is required to gain a deeper understanding 
of the tensions - such as around the reshaping of roles and work practices - that emerge in 
these circumstances, and how they can best be addressed.
Our second contribution relates to the information flow as a unit of analysis. In an era 
when personal data is increasingly at the heart of national security policy and the private
sector is required to share and to process such data, further research is needed to explore how 
such information flows can best be studied. The contributions of such research to future 
policy and practice also warrants further attention.
Our third contribution arises from the multi-level nature of the study and the potential 
insights from adopting a ‘set logic’ at three levels: individual/task, intra-organizational and 
organizational/ inter-organizational. Future research could use perspectives from any one of 
these levels of analysis and explore, for example, the intersection between AML/CTF and 
commercial priorities through a single analytical lens. In turn, this would result in a deeper 
understanding of the tensions between different priorities and influencing processes at that 
level. 










   
 
 









   
   
   
of analysis. At the individual/task level, we suggest that organizations put training in place to
specifically guide front line staff to help them navigate the new tensions they face. This
training could develop staff to balance the conflicts they face in making judgements about the 
legality of financial transaction behaviours, while protecting the organization’s customer
service ethos and commercial priorities. The role that incentives play in reinforcing or 
ameliorating these tensions should also be considered. For instance, a bonus system that puts 
too much emphasis on customer acquisition or sales may undermine efforts to avoid exposing 
the organization to risky customers. Similarly, an overemphasis on speed of processing may 
limit the ability to collect additional customer or transaction information, which could result 
in staff under or over reporting suspicion (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
At the intra-organizational level, we note that firms encountering these requirements
for the first time might consider models adopted by other organizations to manage these 
tensions, such as setting up a separate financial crime department or carefully considering the 
changes in expertise, skills and communication patterns needed in other areas of the business. 
At the organizational/inter-organizational level, organizations may need to respond to these 
new tensions by re-evaluating the appropriate level of resource allocation to regulatory 
compliance. Regulation and AML/CTF also need to be fully considered when managing 
external reputation, to minimize risks to the corporate brand and image.
To overcome the tensions arising from AML/CTF, the UK regulator could consider
adopting features of AML/CTF systems from other jurisdictions. In Italy, financial services
providers are required only to collect the data, which is then transferred to the central 
financial intelligence unit for analysis and action. Consequently, the onus of detection and the
conflicts associated with it, are removed from the financial services organizations. Such a 
system was previously adopted by the UK government in the travel industry. In the now
















      
  
 
   
 
 
passenger data to the UK Border Agency, which was then responsible for flagging suspicious 
behaviour. While this centralised intelligence model would overcome some of the issues 
discussed in this paper, it would suffer from several disadvantages. First, a costly, 
secure infrastructure would be needed to transmit highly personal and sensitive data, which 
could create a point of vulnerability for cyber-attacks. Second, such a system would require
organizations to adopt standard data collection and transfer formats. As has been shown in 
the travel sector (Ball, Spiller, Canhoto, Daniel, Dibb and Meadows, 2014), due to the variety 
of legacy systems in place, this would be highly technically complex and financial 
burdensome to organizations. Third, at a time of heightened sensitivities concerning 
surveillance and privacy, such a move would probably prove highly unpopular with the UK
population.
As the travel sector example indicates, although our study was concerned with the 
financial services organizations, similar conflicts may be witnessed in other sectors. For 
instance, the hospitality industry is expected to be alert to people trafficking; social network 
providers are expected to contain the spreading of extremist content and attempts at 
radicalisation; higher education institutions are penalized if they are deemed to not do enough 
to stop visa fraud, and they also need to monitor and report on students that are at risk of 
being radicalised; and private firms with CCTV systems (e.g. banks and hotels) are required 
to share images from private security systems with law enforcement to assist with criminal
investigations.
While our research concerned the data and information flow from private to public 
organisations, it is also possible for information to flow in the other direction. For instance, 
several NHS trusts in the UK have shared patient data with Deep Mind, an organisation that
is part of the Alphabet Inc. (which also owns Google), in order to train Deep Mind’s machine 















   
child sexual exploitation could make their cache of images available to YouTube and 
Facebook, to help them develop algorithms to detect the presence of such content in their 
networks. While the tensions identified in our research may apply to this type of information 
flow, new ones may also arise. Further research is needed regarding the specific
organizational elements included in such public-private information flow sets, as well as the 
associated organizational tensions.
Turning to the limitations of our study, we note that our data are drawn from two case
studies, in a single industry sector in the UK. While the financial services sector is an 
important research site, we hope that our insights may inspire others to investigate the 
experiences of firms in other sectors of industry, such as information and communication 
services providers. These organizations will likely increasingly be subject to mass 
surveillance legislation, with many already engaged in a struggle with governmental 
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